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Since September 11, 2001, the military and law enforcement agencies of United States 
Government (USG) have faced a serious challenge in planning how to re-organize and re-
deploy their resources against threats from terrorists, extremist factions, and insurgents. 
Law enforcement has been shifting from its traditional focus on post-incident 
investigation to focusing on intelligence-driven prevention efforts.  Emerging voices 
within the military establishment have increasingly called for its transformation from a  
traditional high-tech, equipment-driven battleforce into an intelligent system that relies 
more on understanding the cultural and contextual dynamics of the battlespace and that 
derives more of its actionable intelligence from human sources than from electronic 
intercepts.   
 
With a renewed interest in, and reliance on, human intelligence (HUMINT), an 
opportunity exists for the USG to re-examine its policies and practices for interviewing 
and interrogation to discern whether or not it is relying on best practices that are 
consistent with American values, international human rights and legal requirements.  It is 
clear that, to protect national security interests, the USG is now – and for the foreseeable 
future will be – required to gather information form human sources either for purposes of 
intelligence gathering or for investigations that may lead to criminal prosecution.  
Broadly speaking, the purpose of these interviews and interrogations is to gather accurate, 
useful, timely information that furthers security, intelligence, and investigative interests.  
 
 After 9/11, the USG’s need and demand for effective interview and interrogation 
methods unfortunately outpaced existing knowledge, capacity and experience.  An 
overwhelming urgency existed, however, to obtain information to protect the homeland, 
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despite a dearth of systemic knowledge about our adversaries’ culture and mindset.  
Troubling reports emerged about certain methods used with detainees in Cuba, Iraq, 
Afghanistan and elsewhere. As Robert Fein notes, the  “shortfall in advanced, research-
based interrogation methods at a time of intense pressure from operational commanders 
to produce actionable intelligence from high-value targets may have contributed 
significantly to the unfortunate cases of abuse that have recently come to light” (Fein, 
2007, p.xiii). 
 
 In this chapter, we will modestly attempt to review a few recent developments in 
US law and policy for this vital security-related function and to describe a very promising 
initiative that seeks to chart a course for the future of interrogation, particularly in 
intelligence-gathering contexts. 
 
Multiple Constituencies 
 
At least three types of agencies within the USG have interests in gathering national 
security information from human sources:  Law Enforcement (including federal as well 
as state and local); Intelligence; and Military (Mayer, 2005).  Each tends to have its own 
set of information requirements and its own tradition of methods and approaches.   
 
 Law enforcement interrogators historically have made a distinction between the 
concepts of an interview and an interrogation.  One commonly understood difference is 
that the purpose of an interview is to gather information, whereas the primary purpose of 
an interrogation is to garner a confession from a suspect who is presumed to be guilty.  
American law enforcement personnel operate explicitly under the legal strictures of the 
U.S. Constitution, gathering information (which typically must be corroborated) and 
pursuing confessions for purposes of facilitating a criminal prosecution.   
 
 Interrogators from intelligence and military units typically have much different 
requirements.  Although military interrogators may be required to have a “confession” in 
order to justify a detainee’s continued confinement, in many military interrogations, the 
confession is regarded as being less central and less useful than “actionable intelligence” 
(i.e., definitive information about persons, places, and plans that will inform concrete 
responses).  Intelligence information within this context is used to guide U.S. actions and 
protect national assets and interests, not principally to provide documentation for criminal 
prosecution.  Because there is usually no subsequent court process for fact-finding, 
intelligence and military personnel often must act quickly on information they receive, 
making the accuracy and timeliness of gathered information all the more critical.  These 
differing demands, in part, have led to different trends in interrogation approaches. 
 
 The official interrogation approaches currently used by agencies and personnel 
from the U.S. Intelligence Community have not been proffered in open source 
documents.  Historically, documents such as the KUBARK Manual have outlined some 
of the strategies and techniques – both coercive and non-coercive - that were perhaps 
used in the 1960s.  The nature and extent to which these approaches continue to be used 
is unclear, although the U.S. Government long ago abandoned any official use of 
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KUBARK along with the collateral research programs on which it was based.  Because 
intelligence officers operate outside the U.S. and do not interrogate U.S. citizens, many of 
the constitutional and legal proscriptions that apply unambiguously to law enforcement, 
may not apply in the same way to intelligence collection. Nevertheless, these agencies do 
represent the U.S. Government and their actions do reflect upon the values and policies of 
our Nation, so their actions in interrogations and human intelligence gathering operations 
are a relevant topic of public interest. 
 
 More widely recognized and thoroughly documented are the intelligence 
interrogation policies and tactics of the U.S. military. Most U.S. Armed Forces have 
historically relied on U.S. Army’s Field Manual for Intelligence Interrogation.  This 
manual outlines approximately 17 techniques that have remained relatively intact for 
more than 50 years across successive editions and despite the fact that no one seems able 
to produce any research studies or systematic analyses that support their effectiveness.  In 
2006, this Field Manual went through its most extensive revision to date.  The current 
version is U.S. Army Field Manual 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations.  In 
it “there are 18 approach techniques that can be employed on any detainee regardless of 
status or characterization” and one additional “restricted” technique called “separation” 
that is not authorized for use with enemy prisoners of war.  The 18 approach techniques, 
again, are quite similar to those appearing in prior iterations of the manual, though Clarke 
(2004) observes that “the chapter on Approach Techniques has been expanded and 
introduces some additional rapport-building methodologies that support debriefing and 
elicitation rather than only addressing interrogation in the tactical setting” (p. XX). Prior 
to the release of the new Field Manual, the U.S. Army also revised its organization and 
operation plan to separate and distinguish the disciplines of HUMINT and 
counterintelligence (CI), and changed the official military occupational specialty (MOS) 
designation from “Interrogator” to “HUMINT Collector” (97-E).   
 
 Interestingly, perhaps the most hotly debated issues in public discourse over 
interrogation approaches used by U.S. personnel have centered on what is permissible, 
rather than what is effective. Intelligence interrogation is sometimes portrayed as an 
“across-the-table” battle of wills that is resolved only when the interrogator exerts enough 
pressure that the suspect or detainee ultimate “breaks.” The underlying idea behind this 
blunt and arguably erroneous assumption is that there is a single formula or method for 
success in getting information and that one just varies the “level” or degree to comport 
with the existing rules of engagement.  With that assumption, debates over interrogation 
methods have focused mainly on the amount and kinds of pressures that can permissibly 
be applied to a subject or detainee.   
 
 These policy debates evoked discussion of what rules should bind U.S. operations 
in human intelligence gathering activities, how the language of those rules should be 
interpreted (e.g., how functionally to define what constitutes “torture”), to whom the rules 
should apply (e.g., prisoners of war vs. unlawful enemy combatants), and in what settings 
or venues they might be obtain (e.g., within or outside the U.S.).   
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The Torture Question 
 
At the center of these debates is what some have called the torture question.  The issue is 
whether, and if so under what circumstances, it is (or should be) permissible to use highly 
coercive techniques  - including those that produce significant physical pain or enduring 
and severe psychological distress – to elicit information from uncooperative human 
sources.  In many ways, this is not a new question for America or any other nation, but 
the debate has become substantially less theoretical for contemporary Americans in the 
post 9/11 climate of global insecurity.    
 
At one extreme of the situational continuum is the hypothetical “ticking bomb” 
scenario (Dershowitz, 2001).   The hypothetical posits a set of circumstances in which an 
identified, detained person is “known” to have specific information about a bomb that has 
already been activated and set to detonate imminently, and which is certain to cause a 
large number of (American) deaths and casualties.  Given this set of facts, some argue 
that it should be ethically and legally permissible to do “anything necessary” to extract 
information that will save American lives.  Commentator Charles Krauthammer has said 
that under these circumstances "Not only is it permissible to hang this miscreant by his 
thumbs. It is a moral duty" (December 5, The Weekly Standard).   Others argue, 
however, that the long-term values and interests of the U.S. would be severely 
compromised by allowing the end to justify any means even under the most dire 
circumstances.   
 
 The ticking bomb scenario, on its face, is a vexing one.  Many scholars, operators 
and warriors over the years have thoughtfully argued the merits of differing courses of 
action.  The hypothetical itself, of course, if rife with assumptions that run counter to 
nearly any known “real world” intelligence interrogation and that make it a rather poor 
platform for a broader discussion of U.S. intelligence interrogation policy.  In actual 
practice, interrogators typically cannot be certain, in advance, about whether a given 
source possesses the information that is needed.  Moreover, the assumption that a high 
degree of pressure or even pain will cause and otherwise uncooperative source to 
suddenly cooperate in providing accurate, actionable intelligence has not been 
systematically tested, and certainly runs counter to the experience of many seasoned 
intelligence interrogators.  A source may “talk” under duress, but often the accuracy or 
reliability of the information they provide would be highly suspect.   Just as asset 
validation has become a vital element in managing HUMINT operations, source veracity 
remains a critical – and often vexing – element of interrogation operations. 
 
 The dilemma extends far beyond the emergent “ticking bomb” case, however, and 
involves a range of techniques that may or may not be universally regarded as comprising 
torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.  The U.S. agreed in 1994 by signing on to 
the UN Convention Against Torture to extend its domestic prohibition against torture to 
non-US venues as well.  The treaty also bound its participants to "undertake to prevent 
…other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" that might not rise 
to the level of torture.  Yet, when the US Army investigated allegations of detainee abuse 
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Schmidt Report), it found that detainees were sometimes 
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subjected to loud, noxious music and lights, threats from attack-trained dogs, threats to 
harm the detainee’s family members, questioning for 18-20 hours a day, and various 
techniques of humiliation, such as sexual tauntings and being led around on a dog leash.  
Based on these findings from the Army’s own report and the array of pictures released 
showing similar treatment of detainees in Abu Ghraib prison, America’s image in the 
eyes of the world was arguably tainted (Luban, 2005).  Moreover, there was scant, if any, 
evidence that the more extreme techniques produced any vital security information, or 
that other less coercive approaches might not have done as well or better.   
 
 Following these events, the U.S. Congress enacted legislation that set discernible 
parameters around the nature of U.S. interrogation methods and its treatment of detainees 
in U.S. custody.   A main point of contention was whether the provisions should apply 
only to the U.S. military (or Department of Defense, DOD) or to all U.S. intelligence and 
other governmental agencies.  Some policy-makers argued that intelligence agencies’ 
effectiveness, while operating covertly, would be compromised by a public declaration of 
what they could or could not do in collecting human intelligence.     Nevertheless, the 
Congress eventually passed two laws:  the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 
2006 (P.L. 109-163) and the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations (P.L. 
109-48).  Both contain identical provisions that require Department of Defense personnel 
to employ the United States Army Field Manual (FM 2-22.3) guidelines while 
interrogating detainees and specifically prohibit cruel and inhuman and degrading 
treatment or punishment of persons under the detention, custody or control of the United 
States Government.  
 
U.S. Senator John McCain, himself a former prisoner-of-war in Vietnam, 
proposed an amendment to this legislation that would extend the purview of these 
boundaries beyond DOD personnel.  The McCain Amendment does not require non-
DOD agencies such as non-military intelligence and law enforcement to employ Army 
Field Manual guidelines with respect to interrogations they conduct. A second provision 
of the amendment, however, does protect persons in the custody or the control of the U.S. 
government - regardless of their nationality or physical location - from being subjected to 
cruel or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  
 
Cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment is defined in the 
amendment to mean the “cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment 
prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States, as defined in the United States Reservations, Declarations and 
Understandings to the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment done at New York, December 10, 
1984.”  This seems fundamentally to allow only techniques that would also be 
permissible for use by U.S. law enforcement personnel with U.S. citizens.  Importantly, 
that provision applies not only to DOD activities, but also intelligence and law 
enforcement activities occurring both inside and outside the jurisdiction of the United 
States, essentially extending the protections of the U.S. Constitution to all persons – 
regardless of citizenship - under the custody or control of the U.S. Government.   
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Toward a New Focus on Effectiveness 
 
Resolving a practical or policy-oriented debate over what techniques and approaches can 
permissibly be used in interrogation is only a first step toward determining what 
approaches should be used.  The effectiveness of those approaches for acquiring reliable, 
actionable intelligence is critical.  If a source “talks”, but provides unreliable information, 
the resulting action – at best – may waste valuable resources and – at worst – may erode 
the strength and resiliency of our security apparatus.  The need to understand what 
approaches, techniques, and strategies are likely to produce accurate, useful information 
from an uncooperative human source seems self-evident. Surprisingly, however, these 
questions have received scant scientific attention in the last 50 years. “Almost no 
empirical studies in the social and behavioral sciences directly address the effectiveness 
of interrogation in general practice, or of specific techniques in generating accurate and 
useful information from otherwise uncooperative persons” (Borum, 2007, p. 18, 
emphasis in original).   
 
 Historically, within the U.S., there has been some divergence of opinion between 
the law enforcement and the defense/intelligence communities over “what works” for 
meeting their respective information requirements, particularly where national security 
interests are at stake.   U.S. law enforcement agents and professionals in the DOD and 
Intelligence Community each have had a role in human intelligence collection in the 
Global War on Terrorism.  Even within the US law enforcement community, however, 
there are differing views about the relative merits of approaches that emphasize 
interpersonal influence versus psychological pressure.   The Reid Technique probably 
continues to be the most influential approach and the predominant model of interrogation 
used by law enforcement professionals in the US.  Though the Reid Technique includes 
the need for establishing “rapport” during the interview stage, in the interrogation, 
psychological leverage is garnered less from the relationship itself than from the 
interrogator’s ability to build a suspect’s anxiety and to offer psychologically and 
emotionally appealing alternatives to, and reasons for, confessing.   
 
 The range of techniques emphasizing influence and persuasion has sometimes been 
referred to generically as a “rapport-based” or “relationship-based” approach.  That term, 
however, may not adequately capture the essence of the approach or what distinguishes it 
most from other approaches.   
 
 According to published anecdotes and declassified material, it appears that a 
range of interrogation strategies have been successfully employed with al-Qaeda-
affiliated persons and other militant Islamist extremists since even before the 1993 attack 
on the World Trade Center.  Interrogators and agencies have ostensibly attempted to 
refine these approaches along the way and to integrate “lessons learned” from their 
collective experiences in cases such as the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya, the 
2000 attack on the USS Cole, and the 11 September 2001 attacks.   Some in the U.S. law 
enforcement community believe that experience with detainees in Guantanamo Bay, 
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Afghanistan and Iraq  - both positive and negative – generally support the effectiveness 
of “rapport-based” methods and reveal the myriad of problems that are associated with 
more coercive or aggressive tactics.  Still, there is no known systematic study of the 
comparative effectiveness of different approaches that have, thus far, been employed.   
 
 It has become quite clear, however, that at least within the foreseeable future, the 
U.S. will continue to need critical intelligence from (presumably uncooperative) human 
sources.  In the interest of national security, the future of U.S. interrogation and human 
intelligence collection methods arguably should be guided, at least in part, by an 
appraisal of effectiveness that can be integrated within the boundaries set forth by law, 
ethics, and policy.  
 
A key objective in developing any future approach to interrogation is to provide 
its practitioners with a useful skill-set for discerning meaningful information within an 
inherently ambiguous strategic environment.  At least for high-value detainees, this future 
effort is likely to require an adaptable strategic framework, not just the application of 
certain techniques.  An ongoing US-based initiative holds some promise for prompting a 
next generation of ideas to guide intelligence interrogation. 
 
Educing Information:  A New Era in U.S. Intelligence Interrogation 
 
While the fundamental interrogation objective of accurate, useful, timely information 
may be relatively uncontroversial, there is often a divergence of opinion how to 
accomplish that task most effectively.   As a result, the term interrogation has come to 
suggest dramatically different processes involving often radically different means.  In an 
effort to better understand both the art and science of interrogation, an effort is underway 
to introduce more precision into the language, assumptions, and strategies used in this 
complex dynamic exchange.   
 
In 2004, Robert Fein, a psychologist serving on the U.S. Intelligence Science 
Board (ISB), proposed, and subsequently Chaired an ISB study to explore what was 
currently known about the effectiveness of interrogation, with consideration for what 
kinds of knowledge might need to be developed and applied in the future to improve the 
USG’s ability to gather accurate, useful information from human sources to protect and 
advance the security interests of the United States.  This initiative was called the 
Intelligence Science Board Study on Educing Information.   In the following section, we 
will describe a few highlights from the Phase I study and discuss some developments in 
the use of teams and consultants in intelligence interrogation. 
 
Within the ISB study, interrogation was deliberately framed as a process of 
educing information (EI).  The term educe was chosen because it denotes a drawing out 
or elicitation of information, specifically information that may be hidden, unexpressed, or 
latent.  Educing information, therefore, involves deriving meaningful information that 
might otherwise be unavailable to analysts and decision-makers.  The term “meaningful 
information” refers to knowledge and understanding that may be “of interest” to persons, 
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organizations, activities, capabilities, and/or intentions that may impact U.S. national 
security.   This might include, but is not solely limited to “actionable” information.   
 Two principal tasks arguably drive the pursuit of meaningful information.  The 
first is managing the information exchange.  This involves not only the information the 
source can provide the interrogator (e.g., information of intelligence value, information 
that sheds light on the source’s interests and motivations, etc.), but also information the 
interrogator may provide to the source (e.g., current realities outside the detention 
environment, timeline for release, approval/disapproval of a source’s request for 
additional amenities, etc.).   
 
The second task is managing the relationship.  This requires the interrogator to 
take a wholistic view of the source and of the dynamics between the two of them.  Rather 
than focusing on which techniques to apply, the interrogator continuously assesses, 
monitors, and integrates a thorough understanding of the source’s needs, hopes, fears, and 
interests as a basis for building a climate of cooperation.  Without tending to the 
relationship, managing the information exchange may become needlessly problematic.  
But when these two processes work in synergy, it is possible to create a situation in 
which the source realistically perceives that providing accurate and comprehensive 
information is the best alternative and is in his or her best interests given the present 
circumstances.  Moreover, it may prompt the serendipitous discovery of important 
operational information that was not even anticipated during the planned interrogation.   
 
Within the EI framework, the operational relationship between the interrogator 
(often called the “educing information professional” or EIP) and source is the fulcrum to 
leverage a climate of cooperation. While the term “rapport” is commonly used to describe 
the desired state for a productive interrogation relationship, it has been suggested that the 
term operational accord may be more useful.  Operational accord between an 
interrogator and a source often involves a degree of conformity by the source and/or 
apparent mutual affinity based on a mutual understanding of—and perhaps even guarded 
appreciation for—each party’s respective concerns, intentions, and desired outcomes.  
 
Findings and a report from Phase I of the ISB Study on Educing Information were 
recently published as a monograph by the National Defense Intelligence College (Fein, 
2007).   The monograph contains a collection of eleven chapters exploring normative and 
empirical bases for forming an American approach to intelligence interrogation.  
Chapters include reviews of the relevant social and behavioral science literature, analyses 
of historical interrogation documents, a review of custodial interrogation studies and 
practices, explorations of negotiation theory’s potential applications to interrogation, and 
critical essays on barriers and to success and needed research to chart a course for the 
future of intelligence interrogations. 
 
Toward a Team Approach to HUMINT Collection 
 
Another idea supported by the EI study is the value of using multidisciplinary teams.  The 
assumption is that a team approach operating within a coordinated systems framework is 
likely to provide the most effective environment for EI, particularly from high-value 
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sources during long-term custodial detention. Team members’ perspectives and input can 
be integrated to create a working "case conceptualization" based on everything that is 
known about a source, interests, beliefs, and sources of leverage. The team ideally should 
include an array of relevant subject matter experts to provide advice and counsel on 
various elements of the EI process.  Team members might include intelligence analysts, 
cultural and linguistic experts, and behavioral science consultants. 
 
Integrating the expertise of psychologists and behavioral scientists into HUMINT 
collection / interrogation planning has been implemented on a very limited basis.  The 
expertise has been drawn principally from psychologists serving in the military or 
working for federal law enforcement agencies cooperating with DOD operations.  Those 
consulting in this capacity, which in US military venues are known as Behavioral Science 
Consultation Teams (BSCT), do not conduct or even manage interrogations, but rather 
served as a resource to the interrogator and other members of the team for planning and 
for monitoring behavioral and relational aspects of the interrogation. 
 
Psychologists’ and psychiatrists’ involvement in military interrogations has 
become an issue of substantial professional controversy, however – not from the military 
or law enforcement agencies - but within the professions themselves.  Both the American 
Psychological Association and the American Psychiatric Association have deliberated 
over the issue within their respective disciplines, and come to somewhat different 
conclusions.  Both associations agreed without equivocation that members of their 
profession should not engage in or facilitate torture or any cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment. 
 
The President of the American Psychological Association (then, Ron Levant, 
Ph.D.) appointed a Task Force on Psychological Ethics and National Security (PENS).  
The Association adopted the PENS Task Force Report as its official position, declaring, 
in part, that “Psychologists may serve in various national security-related roles, such as a 
consultant to an interrogation, in a manner that is consistent with the Ethics Code...”.   
Approximately one year after the PENS Report, the American Psychiatric Association 
issued a Position Statement on Psychiatric Participation in Interrogation of Detainees, 
stating that  “No psychiatrist should participate directly in the interrogation of person 
held in custody by military or civilian investigative or law enforcement authorities, 
whether in the United States or elsewhere. Direct participation includes being present in 
the interrogation room, asking or suggesting questions, or advising authorities on the use 
of specific techniques of interrogation with particular detainees.”  While the language is 
clearly prescriptive, the Association’s President Steven Sharfstein, M.D., clarified that 
the position statement did not constitute “an ethical rule” and that individual psychiatrists 
who did not abide by its provisions “wouldn't get in trouble with the APA."  Despite 
some continued dissension within the professions, psychologists and psychiatrists 
continue to consult to interrogations.  In addition to serving as a technical resource, their 
role in military interrogations now explicitly includes a safety / monitoring function to 
help ensure that these HUMINT collection activities are conducted in a safe, effective 
manner.   
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Conclusions 
 
The six years since the September 11 attacks on America have been a critical time for 
intelligence interrogation in the U.S. and for American personnel throughout the globe.    
Faced with an emergent threat to the homeland, security forces faced an unprecedented 
urgency to uncover information that might prevent acts of terrorism or save American 
lives.  It also became increasingly clear that potentially lifesaving, actionable 
intelligence– to the extent that it existed – would be most likely to come from human 
sources. 
 
The US law enforcement, intelligence and military communities have faced new 
demands to acquire crucial intelligence from new adversaries in a variety of contexts.  
Many well-intentioned agencies found themselves lacking detailed, pertinent knowledge 
of religion or culture or requisite language skills.  Working through acknowledged 
mistakes and attempting to learn from ongoing experiences, security forces – and the 
American public – have struggled with the entangled questions of effectiveness and 
ethics in interrogations.   
 
No large-scale, sweeping changes are yet apparent in the USG’s ethos or national 
strategy for intelligence interrogation.   In fact, in late 2007 there was still active debate 
within sectors of the Government about whether specific techniques such as 
“waterboarding” would or should constitute “torture,” with little discussion of whether 
those were even effective, necessary or useful.   
 
Some modest changes, however, have occurred.  The US Army’s Field Manual 
for intelligence interrogation – used throughout the DOD - has undergone a major text 
revision and has been prescribed through legislation as the doctrinal basis for all 
authorized military interrogation techniques.  U.S. Congress passed legislation to 
explicitly prohibit any DOD personnel from participating in torture, cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment of U.S. detainees.  Professional associations have examined the roles 
that behavioral science and medical professionals may play in consulting to 
interrogations and have outlined the ethical contours governing their professional conduct 
when engaged in those activities.   
 
The Intelligence Science Board Study on Educing Information has produced the 
first systematic attempt to look toward the future of interrogations.  The early objective of 
the ISB Study was to soberly examine the science – or lack of science – that might lay 
beneath nearly a half century of U.S. doctrine.  Although the effectiveness of long-used 
approaches remains an open question, there was not compelling scientific evidence to 
support their use or to affirm many of their underlying assumptions.  The EI initiative has 
also probed the research literature in behavioral and social science and begun exploring 
possible applications from new scientific and relational frameworks, such as social 
psychology and negotiation theory.   Whether any of the Study’s findings or 
recommendations will translate into governmental action remains to be seen. 
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An important question to guide the future of US interrogation policy and practices 
is arguably:  “What kind of research or knowledge is needed to point us toward the most 
effective approaches in HUMINT collection?”  In attempting to better understand the 
“effectiveness” of these efforts, it will likely be necessary not just to explore whether a 
specific technique does or does not “work,” but to consider how and why different kinds 
of approaches or strategies might work for certain kinds of detainees, with certain kinds 
of information, in certain circumstances (or under certain conditions).   The future of 
America’s approach to interrogation and HUMINT collection will need to recognize the 
needs and requirements of expediency while acknowledging the fundamental importance 
of attaining information that is comprehensive, accurate, reliable and actionable in an 
operationally relevant context. 
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